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In thinking about a suitable answer to questions like “What is a good
macroeconomic model for a central bank to use?” it often pays to study the
revealed preferences of the consumers. According to Mervyn King (1999) there
are 192 central banks in the world. I have not done an exhaustive survey of their
attitudes towards models, and, even if I had done so, the results might turn out to
be rather unclear, for a number of reasons. First, even when models exist it is
never entirely clear to an outsider how much they get used in the policy process.
Second, often one will see a reference to the fact that the central bank in
question is not silly enough to put all its eggs into the one basket and so uses a
“suite of models”. I have to say that I often have the feeling that the “suite of
models” stance is more about keeping the research staff happy, and creating the
impression that the central bank in question is a “very model of a modern major
central bank, than it is about producing models that monetary policy makers
might find useful. This is not to deny the fact that we will always have to create
some special purpose models that need to be used when considering the impact
of rare events such as infrequent changes in tax systems, but it is the core model
which accounts for most work at central banks. In what follows I will just assume
that the core model that is displayed in the publications is used and I will ignore
the plethora of auxiliary models that are sometimes mentioned.
Core Models: A Potted History
So is there any evidence of a core model which commands widespread
assent? Table 1 suggests that this is not so and leads us to ask why banks can’t
seem to agree on the choice.
                                                
1 I’d like to thank David Gruen for his comments on an earlier draft.Table 1: Core Models in Use in Central Banks
Bank Model SS ECM Stk Exp Size
Fed FRB/US ET-W D N(?) DGDPX-D
or I
50





ET-W D Y? DGDP-
I/Obs
20
Norges. Bank RIMINI GRCO D N(?) DGDP/I 30
MAS MMS? ET-W D Y Most
DGDP-D
34(?)
RBNZ FPS ET-S C Y DGDP-I
and D
?
ECB AWM ET-W D N(?) Most
DGDP-D
15
RBA EGM GRCO D N Obs 5
SS: How is a steady state enforced? GRCO: great ratios/co-integration, ET-W, weak theory, ET-S
strong theory
ECM: How are the ECM parameters determined?. D: Data, C:Calibrated
Stk: Is stock-flow equilibrium highlighted? Y=yes, N=No.
Exp: How are expectations modeled?. DGDPX-D: Expectations depend on parameters of DGP of
exogenous processes, DGDPX-I, independent of these parameters; obs=observable
Size: #of stochastic equations
Part of the diversity in core models reflects the history of macro-economic
modeling. I like to think of this as having evolved through five stages. In the first
stage the dominant philosophy was “fill ‘em in”, wherein the national accounts
identity was written out and behavioral equations were then supplied for
consumption, investment etc. As each of the behavioral relations depended upon
other variables, extra equations had to be added to the system. The only thing
stopping the spiral in the early days was the lack of computing power. Thus most
“induced” variables ended up being treated as determined off-model i.e. as
exogenous. Later, as mainframes became powerful, these models blew out to
gargantuan proportions and their size generally defeated any attempt to follow
the logic of their policy experiments.
2 Outside observers would often come away
puzzled by why certain experiments performed on them gave peculiar outcomes.
Their builders were often quite brilliant at explaining any perverse outcomes,
although the rationales provided led to both admiration and a suspicion that
something wasn’t quite “right. In particular there seemed to be a lot of “free
                                                
2 One should be careful to note that size and complexity are really quite different facets of a
model. As Allan Powell has pointed out computable general equilibrium models are large, due to
their having to account for the decisions of many industries, but not very complex, as the
decisions are modeled in an identical fashion in each industry. The complexity of the macro
models of the 60s and 70s came from the fact that decisions were modeled in an enormous
number of ways.lunches” for monetary and fiscal policy. So it was no surprise that Stage 2
modelers reacted to this situation by imposing intra-temporal constraints that
needed to be obeyed e.g. in portfolio and factor choices. The RDX2 model of the
Canadian economy of the late 60s and early 70s is a good example of this
development. It was just a short step from that to being concerned about inter-
temporal consistency conditions holding for both the private and public sectors in
the models.
Once one starts to worry about inter-temporal aspects the question
inevitably arises of how expectations are to be formed since they are a key
connecting link between the present and future, although it is not necessary that
one has an inter-temporal optimizing framework in order to introduce
expectations. In third stage models rational expectations became the favoured
mode in academia but not so much in operational macroeconomic models. There
one saw a number of approaches. If actions depend upon expectations of future
outcomes one may say that “forward looking” expectations are in a model. Often
a distinction is made between these and “backward looking” expectations, but it
is hard to know what this means. Since rational expectations involves forming
expectations using the information at the time of decisions, “forward looking”
expectations are also “backward looking”. From an econometric viewpoint the
difference is really one of whether the parameters describing the DGP of the
forcing variables of the system (DGPX) enter into the weights assigned to
observable variables when forming expectations. In rational expectations they
do. In what is often called “backward looking “ expectations they do not.
Accordingly, models for which there is a dependence of expectations upon the
parameters of the forcing processes are designated DGPX-D (D for dependent)
while DGPX- I signals that they are independent. When a model was being used
in a simulation mode (for policy analysis) combinations of “forward looking” and
“backward looking” expectations were mostly used, with the weights to be
applied being rationalized as due to liquidity constrained consumers etc.
Sometimes only forward-looking elements were allowed as with expectations of
financial asset prices. In forecasting mode however expectations were generally
replaced by whatever observations could be made directly on these quantities
such as from indexed bonds or surveys of wage negotiators. I suspect that this
will always be the case. For those countries with a reasonable history of
successfully targeting inflation one is likely to see expectations being replaced by
the target inflation rate.
By the 1980s one was able to solve all the computational issues that
combinations of backward and forward looking expectations raised. Many of the
solution methods required the model to converge to some steady state or steady
state growth path and this created a suitable milieu for a distinctive characteristic
of stage 4 models viz these models had a steady state solution and the
responses of the steady state solutions to shocks were consistent with theoretical
reasoning.  Although some stage 1 and early stage 2 models may not have had a
steady state solution, that would have become less likely as computational
facilities improved and many dynamic simulations could be performed. So it was
not the existence of a steady state that became important but rather its nature.The description of the development of the Bank of Canada’s Quarterly Projection
Model (1997) has an excellent discussion of how the experiences of Bank of
Canada modelers led to their desire to ensure that a sensible steady state model
was embedded in their core model. Those constructing stage 4 models believed
that models should be designed so as to have a steady state. Two methods have
evolved for dealing with the design issue. One is the “great ratios”/co-integration
(GRCO) school which either imposes the constancy of many ratios or which uses
co-integration methods to estimate steady state relations between variables. The
other uses an optimizing framework grounded in some economic theory (ET).
However, for a number of reasons, there is not a complete demarcation between
the two approaches.  First, because in an open economy it is sometimes difficult
to find a determinate ET model that appeals and it is easiest to sort out the
indeterminancies by imposing the ratio of foreign debt to GDP.
I doubt that anyone thinks that great ratios are bad things to impose but
the GRCO approach can’t be applied uncritically. If it is some important
restrictions may be missed. For example if Y and Y
* are in constant ratio f in
steady state then working with the logs, y=ln(f)+y
* and the use of y-y
* as the
measure of departure from equilibrium leaves ln(f) to be estimated from the data.
In a system there will often be some constraints on the ln(f) from each of the
variables, and often such constraints are ignored by the GRCO enthusiasts. For
example in a closed economy where GDP is the sum of consumption and
investment then fC +fI =1 but this restriction is ignored in estimation.  Of course
one might say it is just a matter of working out what these are and imposing them
but that can be an enormous task and it may be simpler to just follow the ET
strategy. In practice the distinctions between ET and GRCO methods is also
blurred by that some models have what might be called “weak” theory involved
e.g. a production function is used to produce marginal products that become the
cornerstone of factor demand and equations, and typically these come down to
imposing ratio.restrictions.  Models with this orientation will be designated as ET-
W. Often weak theory implies much the same type of restrictions as in GRCO
and, indeed, often unknown parameters are found by using co-integration
methods. Strong ET models (ET-S) tend to enforce a single paradigm quite
rigorously and often the focus of attention is on basic parameters such as the
probability of death of a consumer.
Recognition of the need for a steady state also drew attention to the need
to have both stock and flow equilibria. Reconciliation of stocks and flows is hard
to avoid with the ET approach to design but can sometimes be left unresolved by
the GRCO school.
A second question that stage 4 models had to answer was how one
describes the dynamics of adjustment to a steady state position from some initial
point. There have been two approaches which are, conceptually at least, distinct.
One is to simply estimate the coefficients in an Error Correction Equation (ECM)
like∆ yt = d+a∆ yt
*+b(yt-1-yt-1
*-c) (1)





* ) is the steady state value of yt=log(Yt)  (of course more lags of
∆ yt  and ∆ yt
*
 may appear in practice). The ECM assumption is not a very
restrictive one as any linear dynamic system can be manipulated into this form. A
second solution is to set up some synthetic optimization problem and derive the
ECM from that. Of course the latter may produce some restrictions between the
parameters but basically there is always an isomorphism between the two.
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In practice the distinction has been less about the methodology used to
justify an ECM model than it has been about how the parameters in (1) are to be
fixed. Here there has been a split between those estimating the parameters from
an historical sample (D) and those choosing to “calibrate” (C). Why should one
find the latter attractive? The QPM builders had this to say about their motivation
for adopting it
“ the inability of relatively unstructured, estimated models to predict well for any
length of time outside their estimation period seemed to indicate that small-
sample econometric problems were perhaps more fundamental than had been
appreciated and that too much attention had been paid to capturing the
underlying economics….It was concluded that the model…..should be calibrated
to reflect staff judgement of appropriate properties rather than estimated by
econometric techniques”. (p 14)
The actual mechanism is spelled out a bit in that paper under the heading of
“matching” where it is shown how one might choose parameters to mimic SVAR
impulse responses, the sacrifice ratio as computed from a Phillips curve in a
small macro model etc. One can’t help wondering about the validity of such
matches. If the models estimated from data were so bad, in particular being
subject to a lot of structural change (and frequent reference is made in the QPM
document to that fact), it seems odd to take quantities from such models as the
reference point for a matching exercise. It’s also a problem that a model like an
SVAR is not an a-theoretic model and one may well be matching up apples and
oranges. Of course the proof of the pudding is in the eating and one assumes
that we should judge these models by how well they have managed to survive
the prediction test that doomed the earlier ones. If the main source of forecast
errors is shifts in sample means, as argued by Hendry and Clements (1999),
then there doesn’t seem to be any higher likelihood that a calibration approach
will be successful than a data based one. It is the intercepts in the ECM that are
                                                
3 One would not expect that an optimal adjustment path would be a univariate scheme like in (1)
but ET models tend to enforce such a scheme since b<0 then becomes a simple way to enforce
convergence to a steady state solution. In this respect the GRCO solution is more general.shifting and not the other parameters of the model. So far we have seen little in
the way of discussion about whether these models have proven to be better. One
has a fear that divorcing parameter selection from a specific set of historical data
is akin to “seeing no evil, and hearing no evil”. It’s hard to find out about model
failure if you never look for it.
In stage 5 we have seen a questioning of the size of the models. The
norm now seems to be around 20-30 structural equations and then many
identities. Some of this reduction was achieved by consolidation using arbitrage
arguments e.g. many of the stage 3 models aimed at capturing the balance
sheets of many financial institutions and so modeled a plethora of interest rates.
These were all compressed into a simple financial sector with a few yields, on the
grounds that arbitrage would force all the yields to be identical (up to a relatively
constant risk premium) and that the extra information found by looking at the
detail of the financial sector was rather small.
Why is there Variety in Core Models?
Why do we see such variety in core models? To some extent it is cost.
Developing an ET steady state model is not a cheap operation as it requires a
team of highly skilled people. In the case of the RBNZ it was contracted out to
the Canadians. The BoE has had a small team working on a new model of this
type for almost a year. Thus not everyone will have the capability of building such
a model.  But I also think that perceptions of the need for a particular type of
model often come from past experiences and the nature of the monetary policy
decision making body. Reading the document which outlines the QPM one is
struck by how the need for a steady state was grounded in past experiences of
models that failed to have that characteristic; Others may appreciate having
some steady state solution but not necessarily one based on an ET scenario e.g.
the RBA.
The banks surveyed above also have a wide variety of styles for making
monetary policy. Thus the Fed, Bank of England and RBA have external
members on their decision making bodies. The background of the external
members varies widely and interest in and ability to think in terms of a
quantitative model also varies widely. The Bank of England probably has the
greatest fraction of committee members who are comfortable with this way of
thinking. Minutes of the Fed meetings suggest that most of the members are
familiar with the ideas but do not see it as the dominant way of thinking about
policy. Traditionally, the RBA board has been largely selected from groups of
people who are unlikely to be familiar with model-based policy analysis. When
monetary policy is made by internal teams, as in the MAS, RBNZ and the Bank
of Canada, it is noticeable that models seem to be much more central to the
policy process, presumably because most of the members of the decision
making bodies are likely to be professional economists.A third reason for a diversity of approaches involves the extent to which
the monetary policy makers have to publish forecasts on a regular basis, the
degree of precision with which they choose to pronounce on the uncertainty
surrounding their projections, and the need to produce accounts of their actions
to markets and legislators. Thus it is very hard to see how one could produce a
fan chart, as pioneered by the Bank of England, without a model. As Heath
(2002) indicates in his description of how the fan chart is constructed, the
process requires the entry of various scenarios into a model to give monetary
policy makers the feel for what the skews of the outcomes are likely to be. Thus if
one does not have to publish forecasts or attempt things like fan charts (as is true
of the RBA) it may not be surprising that there is a corresponding lack of
enthusiasm for a formal use of quantitative models in the monetary policy
process. It would be pretty hard to argue that there is no model in people’s minds
when decisions are made but this is often rather vague and hard to pin down. Of
course that may not matter.  Building a model of a champion tennis player so that
he can understand the science of what he does may not improve his
performance very much. He is good at what he does because he manages to
rapidly combine together large amounts of information and to issue the right
instructions in response. I think there are people who have a feel for the
economy that others don’t have and there would be little point in these individuals
spending a large amount of time thinking in terms of a model, as the latter may
be an unproductive constraint on their thought processes. But it is unlikely that all
members of a committee (or central bank staff) would have such skills since
sometimes these come from a lifetime in the area and it is rarely the case that
monetary policy makers have that amount of continuity.
An interesting feature from Table 1 is that there seems to be some
convergence in views over the need for a steady state and the way to get
dynamic adjustment, even if there are different attitudes to how a steady state
should be designed. The real outlier in the table is the RBA. Except that it treats
many variables as exogenous, the RBA system is much closer in size to the VAR
type models that are rife in some parts of academia. Moreover the RBA model
only features a flow rather than stock/flow equilibrium. This raises a number of
possibilities and questions. One possibility is that the RBA is a forerunner of a
new trend to adopt very small models when looking at policy issues and this
seems worth discussion.
In summary there seem about as many varieties of core models as there
are breakfast cereals available to a consumer entering a supermarket in a
country like the U.S. Like cereals the ingredients are pretty standard but the
products are different in the minds of the consumers and, although one does see
brand switches e.g.Model 12 of the RBNZ, which emphasised GRCO, was
replaced by FPS with its ET orientation, mostly the consumers remain happy with
their choices for quite long periods of time. Still, we should take up two of the
questions which do seem to come out of the preceding discussion. One concernswhat the minimal number of variables would be in a good macro-economic model
for a central bank. The second is whether a VAR can do the job.
A Minimal Size for a Model
How many and what variables should appear in the macroeconomic model? One
can’t really give an answer to this that is independent of economies. But for
economies in which trade and financial flows are important, and it is felt that
stock-flow interactions cannot be ignored, observation suggests that the




Domestic price Level (CPI)
Foreign prince level (imports)
Terms of trade
Domestic Short term interest rate





Financial asset stock (money?debt?)
Govt expenditure
Capital Stock (Household Wealth)?
As soon as one sees this list all sorts of objections arise. Import prices are not
the same as foreign prices if only due to tariffs. The CPI cannot adequately
represent production prices which would be the likely variable to appear in a real
exchange rate index, But it is the CPI that is generally the target of policy and so
it has to be there for any policy discussion. At least one asset price seems crucial
but it is not clear which one to use. Mostly theoretical models have used equity
prices but in many countries in which household wealth is primarily held as
dwellings, it is has become clear that housing prices are a key element in macro-
economic outcomes. Then one faces the dilemma that the variables that are
most important to the cyclical responses of housing prices are vacancy rates and
this may demand an expansion of the model to capture these. One might also
query whether one can just focus upon GDP. Consumption and investment
expenditures rarely go in exactly the same way during any cycle and so it is
almost inevitable that anyone who just chooses to work with GDP will be queried
about which of these components the given change in GDP is due to. It should
also be noted that one may need to dis-aggregate by sector as well as by the
nature of demand e.g. the MAS model has a number of sectors.
Should money appear in the system?. It has been effectively dropped from most
models nowadays simply by treating the interest rate as predetermined and so
endogenizing money. One can’t help feeling that this is a bit premature. It may be
that the way the ECB wants to deal with it is rather unappealing but one has a
gut feeling that liquidity problems will arise some day and the degree of money-
ness will be important to cyclical outcomes. Having said that I suspect the
influence is really a threshold or non-linear one and would be handled in a
particular context by adjusting the intercept in the ECM terms, in a similar waythat most modellers handle a wide variety of other factors that they think are only
occasionally important to the model outcomes (we say more on this below).
Can we get away with smaller models?
Small is beautiful still appeals as a slogan. The small new-Keynesian macro
models that are now very popular in places like the SF Fed do appeal as a way
of thinking about the broad issues of policy rather than perhaps the details of a
particular decision. This suggests that we want to be able to move between the
larger core model and such smaller representations, particularly when the core
model has an ET basis. The ability to aggregate and dis-aggregate very rapidly
was an important one when using CGE models for tariff analysis in Australia. In
the CGE literature this was done by performing linearization in the variable space
so that aggregation could be done to any level desired.  It’s not quite as easy
with macro models due to the presence of dynamics but one can still use
simulation methods to perform the task. Let there be m variables and shocks in
the smaller model and n >>m in the core model. Simply generate synthetic data
using the nxn impulse responses for all n variables to the n shocks and then
estimate the smaller model with this synthetic data.
Do we get anything from VAR’s?
Once one sees a list of variables as in Table 2, and realizes that these are
very much the minimal set that any monetary policy discussion would focus
upon, I don’t think anyone could seriously argue that VAR’s should be used as
the core model for monetary policy work. Trying to fit a VAR with 12-20 variables
and quarterly data is never going to produce much of value. Of course the
number of variables could be reduced if some were assumed to be exogenous
but that goes against the stance of a lot of VAR proponents. Sims had larger
monthly ones with 19 (?) variables at a maximum but I think I have the record of
10 with quarterly data. Even if one could come at the idea that one could think
about sensibly estimating a system in which the lags of every variable are
present in every equation, the problem with VAR’s is that they don’t have enough
capacity to produce interesting accounts of what is responsible for a projection or
a policy action.
I have lots of problems with VAR’s. One is that the driving forces in these
systems are uncorrelated shocks but it is never clear why one can make such an
assumption. Mostly it’s treated as if it’s innocuous, but that’s not so. It is an
identifying assumption in the same way as deletion of a lagged variable is an
identifying assumption. One might be prepared to concede that the shocks are
uncorrelated if the system was a very large one but in practice its hard to believe
that (say) the only variables agents use when making a guess about monetary
policy actions are the six or so variables making up most VAR’s. Most
economists advising on Fed actions would be out of a job. This often means that
the error terms of “structural VAR” equations have common components due tothe omission of some relevant variable from the system and that can produce
quite large distortions in policy analysis. Giordani (2001) is a good example. Here
the equations of the true structural VAR involve output gaps but an investigator
follows Sims et al and uses the level of output so that the errors in the structural
equations have a common component – the potential level of output. Imposing
the assumption that the errors in the levels system are uncorrelated produces a
mis-specification that shows up as a “price puzzle” that was not present in the
output gap system. This can be thought of as a case where there is a missing
variable in the output levels VAR. It’s the principle that an undersize system can
invalidate the uncorrelated errors assumption rather than the precise application
that is important.
There are other problems with VAR’s that also come from their highly
aggregated nature. One is that it is unlikely that a VAR can ever fully capture the
responses of an actual economy since the number of variables entering into the
system are going to be far higher than used in the VAR and, unless there are
some fortuitous cancellations, a VAR(1) in n variables will become a VARMA
process in m, where m<n (a result pointed out almost three decades ago by
Zellner and Palm). The VAR empire’s (or maybe it is an Axis) solution to this
seems to be to suggest that one can always approximate a VARMA process with
a VAR of high enough order. Whilst theoretically true, is it likely that one can ever
make this order higher enough with our limited data sets?
How high an order of VAR might we expect to have to choose if it is to
represent a given economy? To examine this let’s assume that the N.Z. economy
can be represented by the FPS model. We will choose six variables to work with
in the VAR; these were broadly similar to the six that the RBNZ utilized in one of
their VAR studies.
•   Short term interest rate
•   Real Exchange Rate
•  Inflation  Rate
•  Terms  of  Trade
•  Aggregate  Demand
•  Foreign  Demand
We simulated FPS with six shocks which the RBNZ modelers said that they
thought the estimated system was capturing:
•  Interest  rate
•   Real exchange rate
•  Inflation
•   Terms of trade
•  Domestic  demand
•  Foreign  demandWe then fitted a number of VAR models to gain an appreciation of how well
the VAR’s could capture the true impulse responses There are a number of ways
that this might be done. Here we simply make the approximating VAR(K) match
the impulses of the FPS model exactly up to K’th order and then study the
approximation error from then on.  Graphs at the end of the paper show this for
the impact of a transitory interest rate rise and a foreign demand shock. For the
interest rate shock VAR(2), VAR(6) and VAR(10)’s were chosen and the fit of the
latter with the FPS responses is pretty good. The situation is much less
encouraging for the foreign demand shock where a VAR(15) was also used. The
latter seemed to be far worse than the VAR(10) at approximating the FPS
reactions.
It’s clear that it is likely to be very difficult to represent an economy with a
VAR of an order that is usual with most quarterly data exercises. One could
probably make the same point about the ability of small systems like the RBA’s to
capture an economy, but there one is conditioning upon a lot of variables and I
suspect that, if VAR’s are to have a role, then they will need to do likewise. They
also probably need to start working more with identities. But then we are
returning to the traditional structural equation model and we might as well just
forget about the idea of refusing to put zero coefficients on some lagged
variables.
Does it matter which core model we use?
In practice all the models above are subject to adjustments when used in
an actual policy cycle context. Sometimes these are to capture variables that
may either be important in particular episodes but not at every point in time or
which are hard to endogenize. An example might be business confidence.
Conceptually one could add these into ECM equations as deviations from their
means with coefficients that need to be set in some way. This formulation means
they have no impact in the steady state and mirrors frequent statements by policy
makers to the effect that some variable such as confidence is now well above its
historical mean and so it has to be accounted for. However, instead of entering
the variable directly into the ECM, it is more common to capture its effects by
adjusting the value of the intercept in the ECM model.
Intercept adjustment in the ECM has become the standard way of
handling a variety of difficulties that can arise in using the model for policy
analysis. Thus if one believes that the log of the equilibrium ratio of Yt to Yt
*
,which is embodied in the ECM, is more likely to be c1 than c for a few periods,
then this belief can be incorporated by adjusting the intercept accordingly. If there
is a permanent shift in the ratio then the intercept would need to be adjusted to
its new permanent level. If one ignores this then there will be forecast failure
since the ECM is adjusting yt to the wrong equilibrium position. Even if c remains
constant the intercept can vary in the face of non-stationarities. Thus, if we thinkof the growth rate of ∆ yt and ∆ yt
* as being both g in the steady state, so that there
is a constant ratio in steady state, then (2) could be written as
∆ yt = g(1-a)+a∆ yt
*+b(yt-1-yt-1
*-c) (3)
so that any shifts in the steady state growth rate are reflected in the intercept.
Once again one needs to pay a good deal of attention to the intercept in order to
accommodate such shifts. Most models are designed to have a particular g built
into them and forecast failures come if any changes in g are not recognized.
The ECM is a highly flexible tool that makes models very adaptable. But
this very adaptability raises the issue of whether the particular model we use is
going to matter much (except that the utility of some decision-makers may be
increased by consuming a particular brand of model). One’s impression is that
central bank staffs spend a lot of time adjusting these intercepts, and it makes
one ask whether it is the intercept adjustments rather than the model which
dominate forecasts and policy analysis over the two year or so horizon that most
central banks are concerned with. Checking out the relative contributions of the
model and the adjustments to a forecast ( or a policy action) should be performed
on a regular basis, and it would be interesting to know if the users of core models
like FPS and QPM perform such adjustments any less often than those who have
models more loosely based on economic theory, such as the RBA. . For those
models that feature a steady state solution, seeing how well yt* tracks yt seems to
be important as a way of ensuring that the intercept adjustments are not just
compensating for a flaw in the steady state specification of the model. It has
always surprised me that this computation does not seem to be done very much
by the model guardians.
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